The epistemological problem is traditionally expressed in the question “How do we know that we know?” The emphasis is on the relationship between the claim that we know and what it is that we know. We notice, only belatedly, that the agent who knows does not really matter in the question. The knower is but an abstracted entity whose only qualification is that s/he claims to know. Virtue epistemology’s virtue lies in the centering of the knower: What is it about (...) the knower that enables her to claim that she knows or that enables us to agree that she indeed knows? The concept of intellectual responsibility in virtue epistemology does not only brings us into the realm of the normative but also implicates, necessarily, the social and the political. Invoking the openness of alternative virtue epistemology to unconventional sources and methods, this essay turns to metaphysics and social ontology in order to explore the problems of intellectual responsibility, society, and politics in humankind’s disposition and striving to know. (shrink)

The theory practiced as resistance must come to grips with the state and with revolution. To evade, explain away, or assume the state is fatal. And to think of revolution only as anti-state is as dangerous. After all, the revolution's aftermath is revealed by history to be just another state. I argue that the danger posed by both state and revolution can be countered by the multiple in society that becomes contentious - or a contentious multiplicity. The multiple and the (...) contentious are practices that pervade society. The state's objective is to control multiplicity and sublimate contentiousness. The revolutionary strategy is to sublimate multiplicity and direct contentiousness. But multiplicity is dangerous when it is independently contentious. And contentiousness indicates a dialectical process of challenging state power wherein the process itself is privileged over any synthesis. Contentious multiplicity is a practice of freedom. (shrink)

Rizalino Noble Malabed ABSTRACT: The epistemological problem is traditionally expressed in the question “How do we know that we know?” The emphasis is on the relationship between the claim that we know and what it is that we know. We notice, only belatedly, that the agent who knows does not really matter in the question....

This paper aims to construct an account of valuing nature that takes into consideration its interest and asserts its representation within human political institutions. Value, a human concept, is fundamental to human relations. This paper seeks to apply a conception of value to nature that will serve to justify and guide our actions and interactions with it. Our condition is that of dependence and being within nature, conceived holistically as ecosystem or biosphere. As such, the whole of nature can be (...) interpreted as a system of purposes - a Kantian natural purpose. Conceived in this manner, nature invites us to consider the possibility of seeing it as a recipient of moral action. As natural purpose, we are also asked to agree with the assertion that it acts autonomously, and that its action ends with the life-support system that sustains us. All these give us a conception of nature and of its interest as potentially belonging within societal institution. They allow us to ascribe to nature moral value and political agency. Thus, we conclude with two images that appear paradoxical but that would make final sense: us in nature and nature among us. (shrink)

One can argue that the problem posed by difference/identity in contemporary philosophy has its roots in the persistent epistemological imperative to be certain about what we know. We find this demand in Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist. But beyond this demand, there is a sense in the earlier dialogue that difference is not a passive feature waiting to be identified. “Difference” points towards an active differentiating. In the Sophist, difference appears in the method of dividing and gathering deployed to hunt for (...) the elusive “sophist.” Difference is also one of the great kinds that weaves together other kinds. Practically, difference enables the sophist’s expertise of appearance-making as he knowingly confuses things with words. This paper then quizzes the concept of difference in all these guises in the two dialogues. (shrink)